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Abstract
In such growing areas as remote applications in large
public networks, intelligent agent support, intellectual
property and copyright protection, the hardware
security level offered by existing processors is
insufficient. They lack protection mechanisms that
prevent the user from tampering critical data owned by
those applications. Some devices make exception, but
have not enough processing power nor enough memory
to stand up to such applications (e.g. smart cards, java
cards).
This paper proposes an architecture allowing ciphered
code execution and ciphered data processing. An
internal permanent memory can store cipher keys and
critical data for several client agents simultaneously.
The result is a secure processor that has hardware
support for extensible multitask operating systems, and
can be used for both general applications and critical
applications needing strong protection. The deciphering
unit and the internal permanent memory can be added
to an existing CPU core without loss of performance,
and do not require it to be modified.
1  Introduction
New applications in large public networks like the
Internet need more security. In multimedia applications,
programs that we will call agents are dynamically
downloaded into a system at run-time to allow the
processing of new objects or to provide remote
processing to the client side. Examples are plug-in
capabilities of browsers or intelligent agent querying
remote database [12,13,14]. This extensibility feature
raises questions about the integrity of the system, the
licensing of the agent, the protection and privacy of the
objects manipulated by the agent:
•   the integrity of the system depends on the privilege
given to the agent code. It is not always possible to
trust programs obtained from sources such as a
public network. The downloaded code may contain
a virus or a Trojan horse [5]. More likely, the code
may contain errors and corrupt the system data;
•   the licensing of the agent concerns the protection of
the code. The license limits the number of
executions or the amount of execution time, the list
of nodes where the program can be executed, and
the list of services given by the program. The user
should not be able to remove those limitations.
Sometimes, reverse-engineering of the code should
also be prevented;
•   the protection and privacy of the objects is a much
more vague concept, as it depends on the nature of
the object and the agent. In the case of intelligent
agents, the remote server should not access the
agent’s code or data.
These security issues are also true for other applications
like electronic commerce [4,8]. For example, in the case
of electronic commerce, the object to protect is the
electronic currency stored in the system. From the
agent’s point of view, the user should not be able to
credit his account illegally, without using the agent
protocol. From the user’s point of view, his account
should not be lost or tampered with by other
applications running on the system.
While a part of the protection can be done by software,
the operating system (OS) needs sufficient hardware
mechanisms to guarantee the system security. While
existing processors found on workstations and database
servers have adequate hardware to offer basic protection
in multitasking environment, they lack mechanisms
which prevent the user
1 from tempering the software or
its data. That means that it is possible to ensure the
system integrity, although it may be somewhat difficult
to build an extensible operating system. But it is
impossible to ensure licensing and object protection,
since any resolved user can always access the code and
modify it to gain unauthorized privileges.
1.1  Contribution
This paper presents the architecture of a processor able
to run ciphered code and manipulate ciphered data. An
internal non-volatile memory (NVM) can be used to
store cipher keys and critical data for several client
agents simultaneously.
The processor memory management unit (MMU) is
modified to ensure strong agent protection. This
modified unit, that we will call security management
unit (SMU), only allows the owner task to access its
data in the NVM. It is impossible for the user to get any
                                                          
1 by “user”, we mean any skilled person who has physical
access to the computer, and who can modify the application
software, the OS and even parts of the hardware to achieved
his malevolent goal.2
information illegally, nor to modify the content of the
NVM, even by altering the operating system. Since the
user has no direct access to the cipher keys, he cannot
modify the client agents or reverse-engineer the code of
the applications.
The NVM management and access control is performed
by a special agent, the NVM manager, which is stored
externally in a ciphered form, like any other agent. This
agent is authenticated by the SMU with the help of a
dedicated cipher key buried into the processor.
1.2  Related work
Several projects are studying extensible systems : SPIN
(domain and type enforcement extension, access control
mechanisms for extensible systems) [1,2], VINO
(extensible systems assembled from reusable
components, application-driven policy), Exokernel
(application-level management of physical resources)
[3], Hydra (extension with user-defined access rights)
and Mach (moving functionality out of the kernel for
ease of modification).
Juice, Java, and Kimera are technologies for distributing
executable components across networks. They enforce
the security by interpreting the executable, or by
analyzing the source before compilation, but they don’t
provide secret code and data protection.
Work in the hardware security mechanism is
rudimentary. The only domain thoroughly examined is 
smart cards. These devices are standard processor
architectures with specific coprocessors, confined into a
physically secured base. A non volatile memory allows
the permanent storage of data like electronic currency,
confidential information, and other data. They only
communicate via a reduced number of pins using a
standard protocol, so the user is not allowed to by-pass
the operating system and cannot tamper with the
internal components [4].
Citadel is a physically secure workstation coprocessor
that includes a processor, memory and specialized
hardware to perform high speed DES processing [9,10].
The IBM 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor is a
PCI-bus card with an Intel 80486 processor controlling
a DES chip and a RSA chip, and memory [7]. Both are
coprocessor that can be “plugged” into a workstation to
allow fast cryptographic processing and key storage.
They are complete, almost stand-alone systems, not
single chips, and are external devices : they are not
running all the applications, thus the secured
applications running on those coprocessor and the
general programs executed by the main processor
cannot be mixed. Also, the security level of those
devices are lower than a single chip as they are more
vulnerable to physical attacks [11].
The Dallas Semiconductor DS5002FP Secure
Microprocessor Chip, which improves some security
holes of its predecessor the DS5000FP, is at the moment
the closer devices related to our SMU architecture. This
chip can load and execute software that is stored in
encrypted form, at encrypted addresses. Our architecture
offers several advantages in comparison:
•   the DS5002FP executes code compatible with the
8-bits 8051 processor, and it can only address 8
banks of 128 Kbytes : this processor has not enough
processing power for the kind of application we are
examining;
•   the DS5002FP has no basic support for OS, and can
only execute one program.
2  Ciphered Code Execution
Copyright protection and software licensing are usually
done in software, and are grounded on the assumption
that most users have no sufficient knowledge of the
system to break it [11]. While this is true on average,
one skilled and malevolent user can use common
debugging tools and trace the execution down to the
part of code responsible of the protection and remove it.
If all users were isolated from each other, the loss would
not be worth further attention for widespread software.
Unfortunately this is not the case and many users can
connect to Bulletin Board Services (BBS) or to archive
servers on global networks like the Internet. If only one
user is able to remove (to crack) a specific software
protection, he can easily build a small program that does
the removal automatically, and put it on a public server.
Any other user can then get this program, crack the
software and distribute it at will.
Another victim of insufficient protection is Intellectual
Property (IP). Some classes of software (CAD tools, for
instance) require complex algorithms or heuristics that
are not publicly known, their success is mainly based on
the efficiency of those algorithm implementations.
Therefore, it is essential for them to prevent any
possibility of reverse-engineering, which cannot be
guaranteed as long as the plain code is available.
Intelligent agents belong to this category, since they
contain private data that is not supposed to be seen by
the server they are running on.
Finally, if a processor equipped with NVM is to be used
for electronic commerce and similar applications, it
must have some mechanism that only allows the real
owner to access its data stored in the NVM. Any
method of authentication used by the owner software
can be uncovered by careful examination of the code, so
it should be kept secret.
The security management unit solves those problems by
allowing the execution of ciphered code. The ciphered
software is stored in the external RAM, the instructions
are decrypted on the fly by the SMU when they are
fetched by the processor. The instructions are only in
plain form inside the processor. Since the user has no
access to the plain code, he cannot modify or reverse-
engineer it. We call secured task or a secured agent any
ciphered task protected from user tampering.3
2.1  General Principle
The principle, as illustrated in Figure 1, is the following
one: the program P is initially ciphered with a
symmetrical key K, by blocks of length L. We note
ge,K(P) the ciphered program, and ge,k(P[a..a+L-1]) the
ciphered block at position a, where ge,K() is the cipher
function used with the key K. In fact, the encryption is
salted with the virtual address a’ to strengthen security,
so we should note ge,K,a’(P[a..a+L-1]). However, for the
sake of clarity we will keep the simplified notation
ge,K().
When the processor fetches an instruction from the
ciphered program P, the block containing the instruction
is loaded from the external memory, deciphered by the
symmetrical deciphering unit and stored in a cache line,
inside the processor. The needed instruction is then sent
to the prefetch queue of the CPU for decoding and
execution.
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Figure 1 - Instruction block deciphering principle
The user must not directly access the key K, and for
licensing purposes, the key should only be valid for one
processor. Therefore, the key K is ciphered with the
public asymmetrical key of the processor E, which
correspond to its private key D. The private key is
stored in the processor and cannot be accessed in any
way by the user. It can only be used by the
asymmetrical deciphering unit, to obtain the key K. We
note fD() the asymmetrical cipher function used with the
key D. The complete procedure to execute a ciphered
program is:
1.  the ciphered key fE(K), given with the ciphered
program  ge,K(P), is loaded into the asymmetrical
deciphering unit, which deciphers it and gives the
result fD(fE(K)) = K to the symmetrical deciphering
unit;
2.  the processor puts the virtual address a’ of the
instruction on the internal bus. The MMU translates
the virtual address a’ into the physical address a
and outputs it to the external RAM with a read
request for the whole block containing the
instruction (addresses [a..a+L-1]);
3.  the read block ge,K(P[a..a+L-1]) is deciphered by
the symmetrical deciphering unit, using the key K,
which yields gd,K(ge,K(P[a..a+L-1])) = P[a..a+L-1].
The plain block is stored in the internal cache;
4.  the instruction is read from the cache and put into
the prefetch queue of the CPU;
5.  on following fetches in the same block, the data are
directly read from the cache.
This principle, explained for code execution, can also be
used for data processing. If a ciphered data is modified,
the corresponding cache line must be written in the
external memory when the cache is flushed (if the case
of a write-back cache policy). The symmetrical
deciphering unit has to be bi-directional to cipher the
block before storing it to the external memory.
2.2  Security and Performance
Considerations
If the plain program could be stored in external
memory, we could use a pre-process stage in which the
processor would decipher the program and write it in
the external memory instead of the internal cache. This
would allow direct execution of the instructions once
the program is decrypted and the run-time performance
hit of the cipher function would be less important. But
the external memory cannot be considered as safe, since
it can be shared among several processors or devices. If
the plain program was stored externally, the user could
easily fool the processor and copy it.
The processor has to decipher the instructions on the fly,
so the deciphering cost must be taken into account. A
symmetrical cipher like the Data Encryption Algorithm
is fast and well adapted to this application. The
asymmetrical ciphers, like the RSA algorithm for
instance, are much slower, but the processor only needs
this kind of function to get the plain symmetrical key K.
This can be done each time the program is run, before
fetching the first instruction, or only the first time the
program is run if the processor can store the key in the
internal NVM. In any case, the cost is negligible since
only one operation is done before program execution.
Because of the branches in the program code, there must
be a way to decipher the program P starting from any
address. The block nature of the DEA makes it the ideal
function from this point of view, when an instruction
cache is present into the processor. The cache line size
may be a small multiple (1 or 2) of the size of the blocks
processed by the cipher function (typically 64 bits). The
processor behaves like any ordinary processor that loads
a whole cache line, then fetches the instruction from the
cache. The length of the cache line is a trade-off
between security and performance: if the line is too
short, the encryption mechanism will be easily cracked,
and if the line is too long, branches will yield more
penalty (deciphering cost) and the cache will be less
efficient (less cache misses but more bus traffic for
cache misses [6]).4
3  Results
Performance evaluation was achieved by behavioral
simulation of a secure processor architecture including
an 32-bits ARM-7 core, 8-kB data cache, variable-sized
(2, 4, 8 and 16 kB) instruction cache, the SMU and the
DEA deciphering unit. The deciphering unit is pipelined
and its throughput is one 64-bits block per cycle. It has
been simulated with different depth sizes (4, 8 and 16
cycle delay) to show the performance impact of the
cipher algorithm complexity.
The results given in Figure 2 show the overhead of  the
deciphering pipeline in two situations: with an ideal
external memory (1 delay cycle and 1 burst cycle, in
dotted lines), and with a typical memory (3 delay cycles
and 1 burst cycle, in plain lines). The results were
averaged on several real programs ported to the ARM
architecture (mainly GNU tools). To avoid cache
artifacts, and to obtain worse-case results, only the
programs with code size significantly bigger than the
cache size were chosen.
Individual results (not shown for the sake of clarity)
have different overheads, but are located on the same
line if represented on a overhead/cache-hit graph, the
depth of the deciphering pipeline being constant.
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Figure 2 – Deciphering cost
One can see that, for typical values of  instruction cache
and pipeline depth (e.g. 8 kB I-Cache, 4 cycles, or 16
kB I-Cache, 8 cycles), the deciphering cost is kept under
1% compared to a classical architecture running the
plain program (i.e. not ciphered and not secured).
4  Conclusion
The security mechanisms presented in this paper, added
to an existing processor core, allow it to execute
ciphered programs with very little performance impact.
This stands for a stronger protection of intellectual
property and software licensing both on the client and
the server side. A software vendor can, with an easy key
exchange protocol, give a ciphered form of his program.
The software only runs on the target processor and
cannot be illegally distributed. The hardware protection
is not accessible by the user and thus cannot be
removed.
The processor is able to host several secured client
agents, which can manipulate and store critical data
safely from any user tampering. It means that the system
can take profit of both smart card security level and
large resources (CPU, memory, storage devices)
available on a mainframe.
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